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Which companies just had a verified incident, who lends to them and who owns them. Every claim carries its evidence level and its source. How we decide what is confirmed

Global Financial Service Disruptions

Silicon Valley Bank

commercial bank · US · North America · Silicon Valley Bank

Liquidity or solvencyStatus: resolvedTier 1Severity 5 of 5Evidence confidence: highAnalyst-verified

As a bank run hit on 9 March 2023, SVB customers' outbound wires stalled, and regulators closed the bank on 10 March. Unprocessed wires were cancelled and depositors regained full access on 13 March after the systemic risk exception.

First disruption
Mar 9
First public signal
Mar 9 (Customer reports of failed outbound transfers (TechCrunch))
Acknowledged
Mar 10
Restored
Mar 13
Duration
not established
DFX first recorded
Nov 5 14:58 UTC

What was restricted

wiretransfers outcross borderonline bankingScope: institution wide

Outbound wires stuck as 'processing'; wires entered 9 to 10 Mar and not processed were cancelled; international transfers disabled for a period; full deposit access from 13 Mar.

Cause, kept in separate layers

What the institution said
Bank run (about USD 42bn withdrawn 9 Mar) and closure by California DFPI, FDIC receivership on 10 Mar
DFX classification
Liquidity or solvency (cyber: unconfirmed)
Conflicting reports
Reports differ on how widespread transfer failures were before closure; duration left null (day-level ends only).

Dependencies

A dependency is a documented relationship. It is not evidence that the provider was compromised.

  • Downstream: Circle (USDC): USD 3.3bn of reserves stuck; USDC depeg (documented)

Evidence