What happened
ConnectWise said on 2026-10-16 that it was "investigating recent attempts of unauthorized access" involving its Cloud Backup service (formerly SkyKick, which ConnectWise acquired in 2024) and published a suspicious IP address. The attacker held credentials for ConnectWise cloud application identities that customers had consented into their Microsoft 365 tenants, and used them to obtain Microsoft Graph tokens with the apps' existing permissions. Because this is app-only access, no user password or interactive sign-in was needed. Field Effect reported that ConnectWise discovered the unauthorized access on 2026-10-14.1,4,5,6,9
Huntress's timeline shows a password spray from the same address range between 2026-10-10 and 2026-10-14, directory role self-assignments by ConnectWise Cloud Management service principals in about 50 monitored tenants from 01:58 UTC on 2026-10-15, and successful token sign-ins from 144.172.64.128 between 06:13 and 08:44 UTC that day, followed by sweeps that ended at 14:20 UTC. Microsoft says the password spray targeted 327 accounts across eight organizations, generated more than 151,000 failed logons and produced no successful authentication.3,4
In one tenant, the ConnectWise Cloud Management app for Microsoft Teams added itself to the Global Administrator role and a script then added client secrets, expiring in 2028, to two other trusted apps, an MSP management app and Huntress's own app. Huntress later identified a second tenant with post-compromise activity. Microsoft observed application credential changes, Graph reconnaissance and changes to identities, groups and privileged roles in multiple customer environments, and Defender for Cloud observed the actor reading "secrets at scale across multiple Azure Key Vaults."3,4,5
Who is affected
ConnectWise serves managed service providers, who use Cloud Backup to back up their clients' Microsoft 365 data. Channel Insider reported that the incident disrupted operations for more than 2,300 MSP partners. The apps involved had broad access to mail, OneDrive, SharePoint, Teams and directory data in each tenant, according to The Hacker News, and Field Effect said they held Directory.ReadWrite.All.5,6,9
Counts of affected tenants differ by source and date. Huntress confirmed unauthorized sign-ins in 162 tenants as of 19:00 on 2026-10-16; The Hacker News reported 173 on 2026-10-17, citing Huntress. On 2026-10-17 Huntress reported almost 1,000 Entra tenants with sign-ins from the attacker's address, over 300 of them successful. Microsoft said the actor attempted sign-ins to more than 2,250 tenants. Sectors Microsoft lists as targeted include aerospace and defense, energy, financial services, government, legal, semiconductors and think tanks. No affected tenant has been named.3,4,5,8
Microsoft states that a successful authentication "does not necessarily indicate that customer data was accessed or exfiltrated," and Huntress notes that Graph directory reads leave no audit record, so the full impact is not known. Channel Insider reported that investigators found no conclusive evidence of bulk exfiltration from affected tenants.3,4,9
Who is behind it
Microsoft assesses that Storm-0940, which it describes as a China-state aligned actor active since 2021, was responsible, and that it used ARTEX, an open-source multi-agent AI penetration testing framework. Microsoft says the activity did not result from a compromise of or vulnerability in its own systems. ConnectWise's advisory of 2026-10-21 and CEO Manny Rivelo, quoted by Reuters, said "it appears that a China state-aligned group was responsible for the attack on ConnectWise Cloud Backup," based on evidence including Microsoft threat intelligence. Huntress said it had not tied the early 2026-10-15 role changes to the same operator as the later sign-ins.1,3,4,7
Financial and operational impact
No financial figure has been disclosed. ConnectWise shut off Cloud Backup application access on 2026-10-17, revoked certificates, disabled seven application identities at 07:00 UTC that day and took SaaS Security and Cloud Management offline as a precaution. Backups stopped for partners while the service was suspended; ConnectWise says existing backup archives "remain encrypted, isolated, and preserved, with no indication of compromise."1,9
Recovery work has fallen on partners. Each partner must re-authorize every Microsoft 365 tenant through a new application, "ConnectWise Cloud Backup for M365", and "Backups will not resume for a tenant until re-authorization is complete." ConnectWise also says its containment did not remove access an attacker may already have established inside customer tenants, leaving that review to partners and tenants.1,7
Response and recovery
ConnectWise engaged a third-party incident response firm, completed a full reset of accounts and credentials in the Cloud Backup environment on 2026-10-19, and rotated certificates across its infrastructure from 2026-10-24. Phased restoration of Microsoft 365 backups and restores through the new application began on 2026-10-28. On 2026-11-04 it reported Backup Health and Export jobs back on 2026-11-03, Marketplace APIs restored 2026-11-03, Migrations restored 2026-10-28, and SaaS Security and Cloud Automation fully restored, with partners required to reconnect integrations.1
The advisory's 2026-11-18 update carried the status "Investigation complete" and introduced a Cloud Backup application using federated identity credentials, which ConnectWise says "removes the need for stored application secrets." Its 2026-11-19 update says all four restoration phases are complete but also that "Restoration does not conclude the incident investigation," and tells partners not to re-enable previously disabled applications. The two updates read differently on whether the investigation has closed. ConnectWise has not disclosed how the unauthorized access first occurred. Its public status page showed Cloud Backup and SaaS Security and Cloud Automation as operational on 2026-11-19.1,2
What investors and lenders should watch
The incident shows how one vendor's application credentials can reach many downstream tenants at once. Field Effect noted that credentials planted on other trusted apps can survive rotation of the original ConnectWise credential. For lenders to and investors in MSPs and their clients, the points to watch are whether tenants have removed attacker-added secrets and role grants, whether any data access is later confirmed, whether ConnectWise discloses the initial access vector, and any claims or litigation, none of which was found in the sources read.3,4,6
Microsoft said multiple threat actors from various regions are using ARTEX, and a Microsoft executive described the ConnectWise attack as "one of many" AI-driven attacks since early October 2026, according to CyberScoop.4,8
What is not known
- How the unauthorized access to ConnectWise application credentials first occurred has not been disclosed.
- How many tenants still hold attacker-planted secrets or role grants is unknown.
- Whether any data was read through issued tokens is not established; Graph directory reads are not fully logged.
- No affected tenant or customer has been named, and sectors of confirmed tenants are not stated.
- ConnectWise's 2026-11-18 and 2026-11-19 updates differ on whether the investigation is complete.
- Whether 'Cloud Management' (taken offline 2026-10-18) and 'Cloud Automation' (restored per 2026-11-04 update) are the same service is not stated by ConnectWise.
Timeline
Password spray from 144.172.64.99 begins, running to 2026-10-14; no successful authentication, per Microsoft.3,4
ConnectWise service principals self-assign directory roles from 01:58 UTC; Global Administrator self-grant in one tenant; token sign-ins across customer tenants from 06:13 UTC.3
ConnectWise publishes advisory; Huntress confirms unauthorized sign-ins in 162 tenants.1,3
ConnectWise shuts off Cloud Backup access, disables seven application identities and revokes certificates.1
Full reset of accounts and credentials in the Cloud Backup environment completed.1
Microsoft attributes the activity to Storm-0940; ConnectWise says a China state-aligned group appears responsible; phased restoration begins.1,4
Partners can begin restoring Microsoft 365 backups through a new application; Migrations restored.1
Backup Health, Export jobs and Marketplace APIs restored.1
Advisory status reads "Investigation complete"; new application with federated identity credentials introduced.1
All four restoration phases complete; partner re-authorization still required; investigation not concluded.1
Video and further coverage
Reading video and press coverage...
Sources
- 1.Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick) Service Interruption, Trust Center advisoryConnectWise, 2026-11-19 · primary
- 2.ConnectWise status pageConnectWise, 2026-11-19 · primary
- 3.ConnectWise (SkyKick) Vendor Credentials Abused in M365 AttacksHuntress, 2026-10-16 · research
- 4.Storm-0940 uses ARTEX agentic AI in ConnectWise supply chain compromiseMicrosoft Security Blog, 2026-10-21 · research
- 5.Hackers Use Compromised ConnectWise Credential to Sign In to 173 Microsoft 365 TenantsThe Hacker News, 2026-10-17 · press
- 6.Compromised ConnectWise Cloud Backup identities used to access Microsoft 365 tenantsField Effect, 2026-10-19 · research
- 7.Chinese-linked hackers compromise ConnectWise, target hundreds in global attack, Microsoft says (Reuters)The Standard (Hong Kong), 2026-10-22 · press
- 8.Microsoft pins ConnectWise supply-chain attack to China-state aligned threat groupCyberScoop, 2026-10-21 · press
- 9.ConnectWise Breach Exposes MSP Security ResponsibilitiesChannel Insider, 2026-11-03 · press
DFX Cyber Desk, "ConnectWise Cloud Backup app credentials used to reach Microsoft 365 tenants," DFX Intelligence, published 2026-11-19, https://dfxintel.com/cyber/reports/connectwise
DFX Cyber Desk reports state only what the cited sources say. A ransomware group's claim is reported as a claim, losses are reported only as a source states them, and nothing is attributed without a named source. Methodology